I've never read up on his case in this detail it is crazy. I had read a few newspaper clippings but that was it. Our system is so fucked up. In reading the courts justification for this punishment not being cruel and unusual I threw up in my mouth a little. Anyone who believes in American justice and thinks the costitution stands for somehting should read this:
Eighth Amendment challenge to Angelos's sentences
Angelos, joined in an amicus brief filed by a group of individuals, including former federal judges, United States Attorneys General, and high-ranking United States Department of Justice officials, contends the district court erred in concluding that the fifty-five year sentence mandated in his case by § 924(c) did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. We review de novo the question of whether a criminal sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.
E.g.,
United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1258 (9th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Myers, 280 F.3d 407, 416 (4th Cir. 2002).
"The Eighth Amendment . . . contains a 'narrow proportionality principle' that 'applies to noncapital sentences.'"
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (quoting
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991)). Under this narrow proportionality principle, the Eighth Amendment "does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence."
Id. at 23. "Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime."
Id. (quoting
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
Although the Supreme Court has reviewed Eighth Amendment challenges to a number of state and federal sentences, it has struck down only two of them over the past century. In
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910), the Court invalidated under the Eighth Amendment a sentence of fifteen years in chains and at hard labor, plus permanent surveillance and civil disabilities, for the crime of falsifying a public document. Seventy-three years later, in
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the Court invalidated under the Eighth Amendment a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole imposed under South Dakota law against a nonviolent recidivist whose final crime was writing a "no account" check with the intent to defraud.
In contrast to these two cases, the Supreme Court has rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to the following sentences:
A life sentence, with the possibility of parole, under a Texas recidivist statute for successive convictions of (1) fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods or services, (2) passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36, and (3) obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses.
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980).
A forty-year sentence for possession and distribution of 9 ounces of marijuana.
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982).
A life sentence, without the possibility of parole, for possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005.
A twenty-five year to life sentence imposed under a California recidivist statute for the offense of felony grand theft (i.e., stealing three golf clubs worth approximately $1,200).
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30-31.
Two consecutive twenty-five-year to life sentences under a California recidivist statute for two counts of petty theft.
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003).
Considered together, these cases clearly support the Supreme Court's recent statement in
Andrade that "[t]he gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case." 538 U.S. at 76. Applying these principles to the case at hand, we conclude that this is not an "extraordinary" case in which the sentences at issue are "grossly disproportionate" to the crimes for which they were imposed. The Supreme Court has noted that the "basic purpose" of § 924(c) is "to combat the 'dangerous combination' of 'drugs and guns.'"
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126 (199
(quoting
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993)). The Court has also noted that "the provision's chief legislative sponsor . . . said that the provision seeks 'to persuade the man who is tempted to commit a Federal felony to leave his gun at home.'"
Id. (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 22231 (196
(Rep. Poff)). In addition, the Court has concluded that it was entirely rational for Congress to penalize the mere presence of a firearm during a drug transaction: "Whether guns are used as the medium of exchange for drugs sold illegally or as a means to protect the transaction or dealers, their introduction into the scene of drug transactions dramatically heightens the danger to society."
Smith, 508 U.S. at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this same vein, the Third Circuit has held that "
t is likely that Congress," in enacting § 924(c), "meant . . . to protect our communities from violent criminals who repeatedly demonstrate a willingness to employ deadly weapons by punishing them more harshly." United States v. Couch, 291 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002). In sum, the lengthy sentences mandated by § 924(c) were intended by Congress to (a) protect society by incapacitating those criminals who demonstrate a willingness to repeatedly engage in serious felonies while in possession of firearms, and (b) to deter criminals from possessing firearms during the course of certain felonies. Notably, both of these penological theories have been held by the Supreme Court to be valid and subject to deference by the courts. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24-28; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-99.
